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TRANSFER REGULATIONS AND
COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
ERIC A. POSNER†
ABSTRACT
Recent scholarship on regulatory oversight has focused on costbenefit analysis of prescriptive regulations—regulations that restrict
behavior such as pollution—and their use to cure market failures, and
has overlooked the vast number of transfer regulations. Transfer
regulations are regulations that channel funds to beneficiaries. These
regulations are authorized by statutes that establish entitlement
programs like Medicare and Social Security, pay one-time
distributions to victims of misfortunes such as natural disasters and
the 9/11 terrorist attack, and fund pork barrel spending. Cost-benefit
analysis cannot be used to evaluate transfer regulations because all
transfer regulations fail cost-benefit analysis; cost-effectiveness
analysis, however, can be used to evaluate transfer regulations.
Although executive orders appear to require agencies to use costeffectiveness analysis to evaluate transfer regulations that have a large
economic impact, the agencies’ record is dismal. Most agencies fail to
perform cost-effectiveness analysis, and other agencies perform costeffectiveness analysis incorrectly. More vigorous Office of
Management and Budget and, possibly, judicial review could improve
the quality of distributive regulations.
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INTRODUCTION
Every year the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) sends
a report to Congress that discusses federal regulations reviewed by
1
OMB during the prior year. These reports include a calculation of
the aggregate costs and benefits of most major or significant
regulations, so that Congress and the public may be given a sense of
the welfare impact of regulatory policy. But excluded from this
calculation is a class of regulations that OMB calls “agency transfer
rules.”2 The draft 2003 OMB report lists twenty-five such rules, issued
by a diverse group of agencies, including Agriculture, Defense,
3
Health and Human Services, and Transportation. The 2002 OMB
report lists seventy-two rules issued over an eighteen-month period.4
Most of these rules implemented a congressional authorization or
mandate to spend money. An appropriation statute would provide
that a certain amount of money be given to farmers, or dairy
producers, or victims of the 9/11 attack, and would direct an agency,
in very general language, to give the money to the intended
beneficiaries. Other transfer rules were issued pursuant to
entitlement programs such as Medicare or Social Security. Agencies
charged with the task of distributing money under these programs
issued regulations that specified who would receive money, how much
the person would receive, and how one should apply for it.
OMB has not explained why it excludes transfer regulations from
the calculation of the aggregate net benefits of federal regulation, but
the reason is clear. Ordinary regulations aim to correct market
failures, and a regulation that successfully corrects a market failure
generates social value. Cost-benefit analysis distinguishes regulations
that generate social value and those that do not, and an aggregate
cost-benefit analysis of all federal regulations reveals whether the

1. The most recent published report is OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, STIMULATING
SMARTER REGULATION (2002) [hereinafter 2002 OMB REPORT], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2002_report_to_congress.pdf. The draft report for 2003
can be found at Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Draft 2003 Report to Congress on the Costs and
Benefits of Federal Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 5,492 (Feb. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Draft 2003 OMB
Report]. The reports also discuss regulations issued by independent agencies, make proposals
for regulatory reform, and discuss related matters. The 2002 OMB REPORT covers eighteen
months. All of the reports can be downloaded from http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
inforeg/regpol-reports_congress.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2003).
2. See, e.g., 2002 OMB REPORT, supra note 1, at 36 n.30.
3. Draft 2003 OMB Report, supra note 1, at 5,479.
4. 2002 OMB REPORT, supra note 1, at 5,497.
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regulations as a group increase or decrease efficiency. Transfer
regulations, unlike ordinary market-correcting regulations, are not
designed to generate value in the economic sense. A transfer
regulation that pays $100 to farmers also costs taxpayers $100; the
costs and benefits wash out, producing a social loss if administrative
costs are greater than zero, as they always are. Thus, a conventional
cost-benefit analysis of a transfer regulation will always yield a
negative outcome. Treating every transfer regulation as a social cost,
and subtracting the costs of transfer regulations from the net benefits
of ordinary regulations, would not reveal anything about the quality
of agency rulemaking. Rather it would indicate that Congress has
decided to use agencies to implement transfers, something that is
already known. The purpose of the OMB reports is not to tell
Congress that agencies implement transfers; it is to tell Congress
about the quality of agency rulemaking.
But this does not mean that transfer regulations cannot be
evaluated. The difference between an ordinary regulation and a
transfer regulation is, on a rough approximation (to be refined
below), that the transfer regulation achieves a distributional goal or
outcome mandated by Congress. Ordinary cost-benefit analysis
cannot be used for evaluating a transfer regulation, but cost-benefit
principles can be used. The term of art for a cost-benefit analysis that
takes distributional goals as fixed and evaluates the means for
achieving them is cost-effectiveness analysis, a decision procedure that
5
is used widely by policy analysts outside the government. Costeffectiveness analysis is a procedure for comparing the different
means for achieving a given regulatory end; it identifies the least
costly means as the most cost-effective.
Cost-effectiveness analysis is the correct decision procedure for
evaluating transfer regulations. The main reason for using costeffectiveness analysis is that a cost-effective regulation will more
cheaply achieve the regulatory goal than a cost-ineffective regulation.
This point can be made in two ways: Given a regulatory goal like
providing lunches to schoolchildren, a cost-effective regulation will
cost less (say $20 million) than a cost-ineffective regulation (say $30
million) while providing the same lunches to the same children.
Alternatively, given a fixed cost (say $25 million), a cost-effective
regulation will provide lunches to more schoolchildren than a cost5. It is used frequently for evaluating regulations of medical practices; see infra Part II.A.
for an example.
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ineffective regulation. Although many alternative regulations will be
difficult to compare because they affect different people in different
ways, monetization of benefits, akin to the practice of cost-benefit
6
analysis, can be used to make comparison possible.
A subordinate but also important goal of cost-effectiveness
analysis is regulatory transparency. Agencies have many advantages
over their nominal overseers such as executive branch officials,
members of Congress, and judges: agencies set the regulatory agenda
within their domain and also have more information about the effects
of different kinds of regulation. To the extent that agency officials
have goals or values that differ from those of their superiors, or are
especially vulnerable to interest group pressure, they may choose
regulations that their principals would not choose. By requiring
agencies to perform cost-effectiveness analysis of their regulations
and report the results, the principals can force agencies to divulge
information in a digestible form, thus reducing the agencies’ ability to
regulate in ways that the principals would not like.7
8
Executive Order 12,866 requires agencies to use cost-benefit
analysis or cost-effectiveness analysis when evaluating regulations,
9
whichever is appropriate. Its reference to cost-effectiveness analysis
is explicit: “When an agency determines that a regulation is the best
available method of achieving the regulatory objective, it shall design
its regulations in the most cost-effective manner to achieve the
regulatory objective.”10 The same language can be found in the
11
executive order’s predecessor, Executive Order 12,291, which was
12
signed by President Reagan in 1981. These executive orders, and
some other related executive orders and statutes, have caused a
significant shift in the practices of regulatory agencies, and over the
last two decades it has become standard practice for agencies to
perform and report cost-benefit analyses for important regulations
6. For a discussion of cost-benefit analysis, see Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner,
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999).
7. In this way, cost-effectiveness analysis reduces agency costs (in the economic sense) in
the same way that cost-benefit analysis does. See Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with
Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1140–42
(2001) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis saves costs by “ensur[ing] that elected officials
maintain power over agency regulation”).
8. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
9. Id. at 51,735–36.
10. Id. at 51,736.
11. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
12. Id. at 13,193.
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13
other than transfer regulations. OMB reviews agencies’ cost-benefit
analyses and issues guidelines for good practice, as well as drafts the
14
reports to Congress discussed above. With the prodding of OMB,
the agencies’ cost-benefit analyses have gradually improved. These
regulatory changes have in turn generated an enormous academic
literature on cost-benefit analysis and its influence on regulatory
outcomes.15
There has been no comparable activity with respect to transfer
regulations. Agencies that implement transfer regulations recognize
that Executive Order 12,866 applies, but they rarely provide the costeffectiveness analysis that the executive order requires. Although
agencies do, usually, say something about the costs of a regulation,
their comments are rarely illuminating and often incoherent. Some
agencies simply state that the regulation complies with the executive
order without further elaboration.16 Other agencies provide only the
amount of the disbursement.17 Still other agencies do perform, or
claim to perform, a cost-effectiveness analysis, but in fact make claims
18
inconsistent with cost-effectiveness principles. OMB does not appear
to engage in a strict review, as it does for cost-benefit analysis of
19
ordinary, nontransfer regulations; and, as noted above, its annual

13. ROBERT W. HAHN & MARY BETH MUETHING, AM. ENTERPRISE INST.-BROOKINGS
JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN REGULATORY
REPORTING 3–5 (2003).
14. For information on OMB’s activities, see its website at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/inforeg/regpol.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2003).
15. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 4–7, 111, 117 (1982)
(creating a general framework for analyzing agencies and noting instances of cost-benefit
analyses and how they are often prepared to support agency decisions already reached); CASS
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 19–22 (2002) (describing the rise of cost-benefit analysis and its
effect on agencies). Neither of these books mentions transfer regulations or says much about
cost-effectiveness analysis. Nor can one find discussions in the major case books.
16. See, e.g., Disaster Assistance; Cerro Grande Fire Assistance, 66 Fed. Reg. 15,948,
15,958 (Mar. 21, 2001).
17. See, e.g., New Markets Venture Capital Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,602, 28,608–09 (May
23, 2001) (describing the Small Business Association’s and applicants’ administrative costs for a
loan guarantee program); Wool and Mohair Market Loss Assistance Program and Apple
Market Loss Assistance Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 13,839, 13,840–41 (Mar. 8, 2001) (describing the
amounts to be paid to various producers).
18. See infra Part III for examples.
19. There is some evidence that OMB has recently decided to pressure agencies to perform
cost-effectiveness analysis on transfer regulations. See Letter from John D. Graham,
Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB, to Hon. Hector H.
Barreto, Administrator, SBA, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/sba_eidl-rtnltr.html
(Feb. 11, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (sending a rule back to the SBA for costeffectiveness analysis); Letter from John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Information and
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reports to Congress do not discuss the quality of the cost-effectiveness
analyses performed by agencies during the prior year. The academic
literature on transfer regulations is nil.
What explains the contrast between the intensity of interest in
cost-benefit analysis of regulations designed to solve market failures,
and cost-effectiveness analysis of transfer regulations? OMB says
nothing about this topic in its reports to Congress: it lists the transfer
regulations without explaining why their costs and benefits are not
discussed. A separate document, the Best Practices Guidelines,
implies without saying explicitly that transfer regulations are not
susceptible to cost-benefit analysis because cost-benefit analysis is not
20
designed to evaluate transfers. But the obvious rejoinder, that costeffectiveness analysis can be used to evaluate transfer regulations, is
not discussed. In short, there has been virtually no discussion—not by
OMB or the agencies, not by academics—about the use of costeffectiveness analysis to evaluate transfer regulations that disburse
money or other benefits to specified groups.
This Essay is a first effort to fill this gap. Part I defines transfer
regulations and discusses their purposes and effects. Part II discusses
cost-effectiveness analysis and explains how it can be used to evaluate
both transfer regulations and the statutes that authorize transfer
regulations. Part III provides some examples of how agencies
evaluate transfer regulations. Agencies sometimes claim to perform
cost-effectiveness analysis on transfer regulations, but they rarely
perform it correctly. Throughout, it should be understood that there

Regulatory Affairs, OMB, to Hon. Bill Hawks, Undersecretary for Marketing and Regulatory
Programs, United States Department of Agriculture, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
inforeg/usda_ee_for_nonhuman_primates_rtnltr012902.html (Jan. 29, 2002) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (sending proposed policy back to USDA for cost-effectiveness analysis).
The Draft 2003 OMB Report contains greater attention to cost-effectiveness analysis than in the
past, see Draft 2003 OMB Report, supra note 1, at 5,499–503, but the context suggests that
OMB has cost-effectiveness analysis of market-correcting regulations in mind, not of transfer
regulations. In addition, the administrator of Medicare has recently decided to use costeffectiveness analysis to evaluate Medicare coverage. See Robert Pear, U.S. Limiting Costs of
Drugs for Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2003, at A1 (describing how the Bush administration
has begun to weigh cost as a factor in deciding whether Medicare should pay for new drugs and
medical procedures).
20. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 § III(c)(2), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
print/riaguide.html (1996) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“While transfers should not be
included in the [executive order’s] estimates of the benefits and costs of a regulation, they may
be important for describing the distributional effects of a regulation.”).
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is no presumption that transfer regulations are undesirable; they can
be used to good and bad ends, just like any other kind of regulation.
I. WHAT ARE TRANSFER REGULATIONS?
A. A Typology of Regulations
Regulations, as Table 1 shows, can be divided into two types:
prescriptive regulations and transfer regulations. Prescriptive
regulations are rules that place restrictions on behavior; examples
include rules that restrict factory emissions, mandate safe workplaces,
and require testing before drugs are marketed. Transfer regulations
are rules that distribute money and other resources to firms or
individuals. A regulation that distributes cash to victims of a natural
disaster is a transfer regulation. However, transfer regulations do not
always involve the disbursement of cash. Some transfer regulations
distribute in-kind benefits such as food stamps, housing, or licenses to
use the radio spectrum. The Appendix lists significant transfer
regulations reviewed by OMB between April 1 and September 30,
2001.21
TABLE 1
TYPES OF REGULATIONS
Type
Prescriptive
Transfer

Definition
A regulation that
restricts behavior
A regulation that transfers
money or goods to
beneficiaries

Example
Limitation on emission
of a pollutant
Distribution of funds to
victims of a natural disaster

The regulations on OMB’s list are diverse. They govern
application procedures and eligibility criteria for cash relief for
farmers whose crops have been destroyed by bad weather or driven
from the market by foreign competition; the ingredients of the
national school lunch and breakfast program; Medicare

21. The list includes “[s]ignificant regulatory action[s]” under Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58
Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (Oct. 4, 1993), which are regulations that have an impact of at least
$100 million; “major” rules under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (2000); and
rules above the threshold of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1538
(2000).
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reimbursement for the cost of self-management training for diabetics;
prescription drug benefits for military personnel; disability criteria for
children in the Social Security system; affirmative action reporting
requirements for government contractors; disaster relief; and
22
requirements for receiving certain small business loans. The thread
running through the regulations on OMB’s list is that they are
authorized by a congressional appropriation or budgetary statute, or a
statute that establishes an entitlement program.
The purposes of regulation can be divided into two categories:
correcting market failures and redistributing wealth. For example, a
pollution regulation corrects a market failure, and a regulation that
reimburses farmers who lost crops redistributes wealth. One might be
tempted to generalize from these examples and conclude that all
prescriptive regulations are designed to correct market failures and
all transfer regulations are designed to redistribute resources to
favored groups. But although this assumption is roughly true as an
empirical matter, it is not an analytic truth. A transfer regulation can
be designed to improve efficiency, and a prescriptive regulation can
be designed to transfer resources to a group.
Consider, for example, a regulation that implements a
congressional appropriation for monetary relief to victims of a natural
disaster. This regulation looks like a straightforward transfer of
money from the government to individuals, but it might be justified
by a failure in the insurance market. If the insurance market fails to
provide disaster insurance, the government might be justified in
providing that insurance. One way to provide such insurance is to
wait for a disaster to occur and then make payments to victims. If, as
seems likely, people anticipate these transfers ex ante, then the
regulation (in theory) enhances efficiency by enabling people to pool
risk.
As for prescriptive regulations that serve distributional purposes,
consider regulations that implement a congressional plan to support
farm prices through a quota system. The regulations do not transfer
money to farmers, but rather limit the amount of production. Yet
through the limitation on production, prices are increased and
farmers are benefited. Although the regulation prescribes behavior, it
serves a distributional aim, not efficiency.

22.

See the Appendix, infra.
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B. The Appropriate Decision Procedure
To bring order to this confusion, one needs to make a number of
distinctions, as shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2
PURPOSES OF REGULATIONS

Type of
Regulation

Purpose of Regulation
Efficiency
benefit not
benefit specified
specified by
by statute
statute

Prescriptive

cost-effectiveness

cost-benefit

Transfer

cost-effectiveness

∅

distribution

costeffectiveness
costeffectiveness

There are two types of regulations—prescriptive and transfer—
and two broad types of statutory goalsto increase efficiency and to
make distributions. Within the category of efficiency-oriented
statutes, some statutes state that the regulations should achieve
relatively abstract benefits—public health, for example—and other
statutes specify a concrete benefit, such as reduction in the emission
of a particular pollutant.
Cost-benefit analysis can be used only to evaluate prescriptive
regulations authorized by statutes that do not specify the distribution
in detail. A pollution statute that directs an agency to enhance public
health gives the agency the discretion to choose among alternative
23
regulations on the basis of their efficiency; a pollution statute that
directs an agency to limit pollution to a certain level does not give the
agency the option to refrain from regulating when the statutory level
is itself inefficient. Thus, cost-benefit analysis cannot be used in the
latter case, though cost-effectiveness analysis can be used to
distinguish among more or less costly ways to achieve the statutory
level of pollution.
Cost-benefit analysis cannot be used to evaluate transfer
regulations that are issued pursuant to a statute that is designed to
23. Unless the statute mandates a minimum level of regulation when any amount of
regulation is inefficient.
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enhance efficiency. Consider a statute that funds general scientific
research on the theory that the market undersupplies such research.
An agency is directed to issue transfer regulations that provide the
rules for applying for grants. The statute might or might not have the
effect of enhancing efficiency through regulation, but the agency
cannot veto the statute, so there is no point in doing a cost-benefit
analysis of the entire statutory scheme. The agency can only do costeffectiveness analysis, which will reveal whether a given regulation is
less costly than alternative regulations for accomplishing the statutory
goal of converting money into knowledge.
When one turns to statutes that have distributional aims, one
sees that neither prescriptive regulations nor transfer regulations can
be evaluated using cost-benefit analysis. Again, when a statute
specifies a distribution, cost-benefit analysis cannot be used. But costeffectiveness analysis is appropriate, as will be seen.
Statutory distributional schemes generally have two distinct
purposes. The first purpose is to benefit a politically influential group,
such as dairy producers or tobacco farmers. No serious scholar
defends these transfers, and their unattractiveness might explain why
the academic literature has ignored them. The implicit assumption
seems to be that if these transfers are bad, then the regulations that
implement them are bad, and there is no reason to discuss how to
make them cost-effective. This response, however, is wrong. Even if
politically motivated transfers are regrettable, they are a fact of life,
and it is an important task to analyze how to implement them in a
way that minimizes their disruptive impact on the economy.
The second purpose of transfer regulations is to benefit poor
people, people who suffer from discrimination, and people who have
suffered a misfortune. Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid
authorize transfer regulations that provide benefits to the poor and
not-so-poor. Regulations implementing affirmative action programs
24
for government contractors benefit victims of discrimination. The
regulations governing both the disbursements of 9/11 moneys and
25
moneys for natural disasters benefit victims of a misfortune.
24. See, e.g., Participation by Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in Procurement Under
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Financial Assistance Agreements, 68 Fed. Reg.
43,823, 43,824 (proposed July 24, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 30, 31, 33, 35, 40)
(describing the EPA’s efforts to ensure its affirmative action program is in line with decisions of
the United States Supreme Court).
25. See, e.g., September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2003)
(outlining the final rules regarding the disbursement of funds to victims of the attacks).
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Although market-correcting rationales are sometimes given for these
programs, their thrust seems to be redistributive. Regulations are
needed because Congress does not want to determine every detail
about how funds are allocated and disbursed; that is why Congress
transfers these functions to an agency. Limited transfers to poor and
unfortunate people are relatively uncontroversial, and it is thus a
puzzle that the question of how to evaluate agency regulations that
implement these transfers has been neglected by legal scholars.
Distributional statutes, then, are sometimes normatively
defensible and sometimes not. But it is important to see that
prescriptive regulations and transfer regulations authorized by
distributional statutes all fail a standard cost-benefit analysis, that is,
one that does not use a multiplier to adjust for the lower purchasing
26
power of the poor. When a regulation disburses cash, the benefits
can be no greater than the costs, and will be lower as long as there is
some administrative cost. Consider a payment of $100 to a dairy
producer. The benefit of the regulation is $100, and the cost of the
regulation is $100 plus administrative expenses (and tax distortions if
such is the case). This remains true for transfers to the poor. The
benefit of a $100 transfer to a poor person is $100, and the cost is $100
plus administrative expenses. It is true that a poor person is likely to
value $100 more than a rich person (or dairy producer) is, but such
differences are excluded from cost-benefit analysis as it is usually
performed.27 Cost-benefit analysis does not take account of the fact
that the poor person values $100 more than the rich person does.
Thus, cost-benefit analysis will also conclude that transfers to interest
groups and poor people produce negative net benefits; it does not
allow one to distinguish between these types of transfers, and it does
not allow one to distinguish between better and worse regulations
given a particular distributional goal.
In sum, cost-benefit analysis cannot be used to evaluate transfer
or prescriptive regulations that have distributional aims, or to
26. At one time economists believed that multipliers could be used to reflect variation in
the valuation of marginal dollars by people of different wealth, but this project foundered on
technical, empirical, and philosophical difficulties. For a brief discussion, see HARVEY S.
ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 259–60 (3d ed. 1992).
27. There are some limited exceptions. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner,
Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105,
1136–37 (2000) (analyzing cost-benefit analyses where the marginal utility of money based on
wealth is factored in); Adler & Posner, supra note 6, at 194–97 (describing the need to factor in
distorted preferences, such as those that arise from wealth differences, when performing costbenefit analyses).
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evaluate transfer regulations that implement statutes with efficiency
goals that do not leave the benefit or distribution decision to agencies.
For all these purposes, cost-effectiveness analysis is necessary. The
next Part focuses on the simplest case—the use of cost-effectiveness
analysis to evaluate transfer regulations authorized by statutes with
distributional goals—though most of what is said will apply to the
other cases as well.
II. ANALYSIS OF TRANSFER REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
A. Analysis of Regulations
A cost-effective transfer regulation distributes resources less
wastefully than alternative transfer regulations do. To take a simple
example, consider a statute that authorizes an agency to distribute
$10 million to victims of a natural disaster. The agency considers two
transfer regulations. The first provides a lump sum payment of $1,000
to each of the 10,000 people living in the affected area. The second
requires individuals to apply for reimbursement of their losses and to
provide evidence of the losses. The first regulation will
overcompensate some people and undercompensate others, but it will
save administrative costs. The second regulation will provide more
accurate compensation, but will also generate sizable administrative
costs. A cost-effectiveness analysis permits comparison of the two
regulations. The more cost-effective regulation is the one that
provides the fullest compensation to the most people—the first
regulation if the natural disaster caused everyone about the same
amount of harm greater than or equal to $1,000; the second
regulation if the disaster affected people unequally and proof is not
too costly because records are complete and losses can be easily
computed.
Cost-effectiveness analysis comes in many flavors. Some
decisionmakers evaluate medical interventions by taking as fixed the
goal of increasing “quality adjusted life years” (QALY), and
comparing medical interventions on the basis of the ratio of QALYs
saved to cost. A quality adjusted life year is a measure that represents
the value to a person of living a year with a medical condition that
degrades the quality of life. A government medical agency with a
fixed budget and the mandate to increase QALYs will purchase
medical devices with higher QALY/cost ratios until the budget is
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28
exhausted. The budgetary outlay and the mandate to maximize
QALYs are fixed; cost-effectiveness analysis tells the agency which
medical devices maximize QALYs given the budgetary constraint.
Another example of cost-effectiveness analysis comes from its
use to evaluate environmental projects. Suppose that a certain
environmental goal—a reduction of air pollution, for example—is
provided by statute, but the agency is given the discretion to choose
among means. The agency can mandate the washing of coal prior to
its use in power plants, or the use of scrubbers attached to
smokestacks, or some combination; or it can choose to put limits on
the amount of pollution generated by factories while allowing factory
owners to choose among different technologies; or it can create a
system of tradable emission permits; or it can choose some other rule
29
or framework for achieving the ends set by statute. For a given
reduction of air pollution, each regulatory instrument will have a
different cost. Cost-effectiveness analysis compares the costs of the
different means and identifies the least-cost means as the most costeffective.30
A third example of cost-effectiveness analysis is its use to
evaluate income redistribution programs. The goal is redistribution of
wealth from rich to poor; the constraint is the willingness of taxpayers
to pay for the redistribution. The policy analyst must evaluate
different mechanisms, none of which is perfect. Tax and transfer
systems, for example, require administratively costly determinations
of need or else result in the inclusion of wealthy people with low
income or the exclusion of poor people with higher incomes (for
example, because they have many children or high medical costs).
Minimum wage laws are less complex, but they exclude nonworkers
and may hurt low-income workers. Tax and transfer systems distort

28. See, e.g., Robert Fabian, The Qualy Approach, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY: AN
ECONOMIC APPROACH 118, 118–19 (George Tolley et al. eds., 1994); Arti K. Rai, Rationing
Through Choice: A New Approach to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health Care, 72 IND. L.J.
1015, 1048–52 (1997). For an example from the medical literature, see Daniel Polsky et al.,
Economic Evaluation of Breast Cancer Treatment: Considering the Value of Patient Choice, 21 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1139, 1139 (2003).
29. See LAWRENCE H. GOULDER ET AL., THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF ALTERNATIVE
INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN A SECOND-BEST SETTING 1–3 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6464, 1998) (analyzing the costs of various
methods to reduce pollution).
30. For a well-known example, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER,
CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 66–72 (1981) (arguing that the most cost-effective, short-term method
for reducing air pollution from coal involves coal washing, not factory scrubbing).
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labor-leisure choices; minimum wage laws impose deadweight costs
on consumers or shareholders. A cost-effectiveness analysis cuts
through these apparent incommensurables and shows that tax and
transfer systems are likely to be superior: holding constant the
31
payments to beneficiaries, they result in lower social cost.
The basic idea behind cost-effectiveness analysis is that of
comparing alternative regulations or projects when either the costs or
32
the benefits are fixed. The right form of cost-effectiveness analysis
depends heavily on the statutory goal. Suppose, for example, that
Congress appropriates $100 million and authorizes the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) to spend it on lunches for needy
schoolchildren. Consider three alternative regulations: (1) give the
money to schools in poor census districts; (2) give the money to
schools in proportion to the number of needy students in each school;
or (3) give school lunch vouchers to parents whose family income falls
below the poverty line.33
Each alternative has different costs. Under (1), USDA must
process applications from schools and monitor their behavior to
ensure that the money is used to buy lunches, but this approach
avoids the need to determine the poverty level of individual students.
Under (2), USDA deals with a larger number of schools and engages
in more intensive monitoring, but it will also deliver lunches to more
poor students. Under regulation (3), USDA must print and distribute
vouchers and ensure that they are used properly, but it will also reach
children who are not at school, and children at schools that fail to
apply for school lunch benefits. The regulations provide, respectively,
increasing accuracy at increasing cost.
Cost-effectiveness analysis of these alternatives can be illustrated
with a few numbers. If USDA itself paid all of the administrative
costs (including those of the schools and parents) from the
appropriation, the calculation would be simple. Just choose the
regulation that gets the most lunches to needy children. If, as is more
likely, USDA’s administrative costs come from another
appropriation, and schools and parents must absorb their own

31. EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS
123–33 (1981).
32. I follow the simple discussion in EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A
PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 153–55 (1978).
33. This example is based loosely on the regulation discussed infra in Part III.B.
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administrative costs, then a slightly more complex calculation is
needed, as illustrated by Table 3.
TABLE 3
SCHOOL LUNCH EXAMPLE APPROPRIATION FIXED

Reg.

Lunches
to Needy
Children

Lunches
to Other
Children

Total
Admin.
Costs

Approp. +
Admin.
Costs

(1)
(2)
(3)

15 million
18 m.
19 m.

5 m.
2 m.
1 m.

$10 m.
$20 m.
$30 m.

$110 m.
$120 m.
$130 m.

Cost per
Lunch to
Needy
Child
$7.33
$6.67
$6.84

The cost of a regulation includes all its costs, not just the costs
directly incurred by the agency. If beneficiaries, such as families, or
intermediaries, such as schools, must incur costs in order to receive
the benefits, then their costs must be included in the costeffectiveness analysis. As such, the fifth column of Table 3 lists the
combined cost of each regulation. Dividing the combined cost of each
regulation by the number of beneficiaries under each regulationthe
number of needy children listed in the second columnyields the
average cost of delivering a lunch to a needy child (column six).
According to this column, regulation (2) is the most cost-effective: it
sends lunches to needy children at the least cost per child.
Congress might alternatively pass a statute that directs USDA to
provide lunches for, say, 20 million needy children, to be paid out of a
general appropriation. Again, USDA would come up with various
alternative regulations, and then it would compare them, as in
Table 4.
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TABLE 4
SCHOOL LUNCH EXAMPLEBENEFIT FIXED

Reg.

Lunches
to Needy
Children

Lunches
to Other
Children

Total
Admin.
Costs

(1)
(2)
(3)

20 million
20 m.
20 m.

8 m.
4 m.
1.5 m.

$13 m.
$23 m.
$33 m.

Cost of
Lunches
($5 per
lunch)
$140 m.
$120 m.
$107.5 m.

Cost per
Lunch to
Needy
Child
$7.65
$7.15
$7.03

All three of the regulations provide the same benefits (second
column). The most cost-effective regulation is regulation (3) because
it costs least per lunch to deliver these benefits (last column).
I have simplified in order to convey the basic principles of costeffectiveness analysis. A few observations are now necessary. First,
note the difference between cost-benefit analysis and costeffectiveness analysis. All of these regulations would fail a standard
cost-benefit analysis, because a transfer to needy children is not a
“benefit” in the conventional economic sense—it’s just a transfer. The
cost to the taxpayer offsets the benefit to the needy child, and the
administrative costs are a deadweight loss. To fulfill the congressional
mandate to transfer resources to needy children, USDA could not use
cost-benefit analysis.
Second, the cost-effectiveness analysis, as I have performed it,
assumes that the value of getting a lunch to a non-needy child is zero.
This might be a reasonable assumption, but it also might not be true.
Congress could worry that non-needy children do not always have
nutritional lunches and want to remedy this situation. Thus, a more
accurate cost-effectiveness analysis might attach some weight to a
lunch received by a non-needy child—say, 10 percent of the value of a
lunch to a needy child—and the agency could use this weighting in the
cost-effectiveness analysis; it should also make the weighting explicit,
so that elected officials would know the basis of the decision. In some
situations, this might produce different results—regulation (1) might
be better than regulation (2) or regulation (3)—but it also seems
reasonable for the agency to take its lead from Congress, and not
attach value to the receipt of lunches by non-needy children unless
Congress says otherwise.
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Third, one might argue in the first example that the choice of
regulation (2) defeats Congress’s purpose: Congress wants to get as
many lunches to needy children as possible, and for that purpose
regulation (3) is better, even if more costly per lunch. But it would be
better for USDA to return to Congress and ask for a larger
appropriation, so that 19 million needy children would be benefited
using regulation (2), explaining that the extra budgetary expense is
less than the administrative costs under regulation (3).
Fourth, one should note that Congress could choose different
ends—at a higher or lower level of abstraction. Congress could ask
USDA to ensure that all children have adequate nutrition,
understanding that poorer children need more aid. Congress could
give USDA the option to provide school breakfasts as well as lunches,
or more food stamps, or cash assistance, or educational programs
about good eating habits, and so forth. Congress might also stipulate
the nutritional content of the lunches, or leave that decision up to
USDA. The more discretion that USDA has, the more complex the
cost-effectiveness analysis will be. As the level of abstraction
increases, cost-effectiveness analysis becomes the same as cost-benefit
analysis.
One problem with using cost-effectiveness analysis to evaluate
transfer regulations is that if the underlying transfer statute itself is
bad, then one is firmly in the world of the second best, and costeffectiveness analysis might have perverse effects. Consider a statute
that appropriates $100 million for dairy producers because of their
political influence and not because of any legitimate need. A highly
cost-effective statute will result in more money in the pockets of the
dairy producers and less squandered on administrative expenses, but
that just means more slops in the political trough, and more lobbyists
34
sidling up to it. (This problem is not as severe for regulations that
35
survive cost-benefit analysis. ) Cost-effectiveness is not an ultimate
moral value; the social value of even a highly cost-effective regulation
depends on the social value of the statutory program that it
implements. For that reason, it might be desirable for agencies to

34. Cf. Gary Becker & Casey Mulligan, Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government, 46
J. LAW & ECON 293 (1998).
35. Though there are some potential similar problems. See Posner, supra note 7, at 1163–65
(describing problems with cost-benefit analysis where, for example, the president transfers
money to special interest groups simply to get elected).
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evaluate the authorizing statute as well as the regulations. This is the
topic of the next Section.
B. Analysis of the Authorizing Statute
When Congress authorizes a distribution to a particular group,
agencies cannot usually prevent the distribution from occurring as
36
intended. But there are actions short of interference that might
improve distributional outcomes and the political process that leads
to them. Of special interest are reporting requirements, such as those
created by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),37 which
38
requires agencies to issue environmental impact statements. Rather
than banning activity that harms the environment, NEPA requires
agencies to estimate and report the environmental impact of projects
such as the construction of highways.39 Opponents of the regulation
cannot seek relief from a court unless an agency fails to issue an
adequate environmental impact statement. If the environmental
impact statement is adequate, opponents must take their case to
elected officials and seek a political remedy.
Agencies that issue transfer regulations could similarly be
required to report the welfare costs and distributional effects of these
regulations—that is, to issue “welfare impact statements.” If the
welfare impact is objectionable, then critics can bring this information

36. I put aside the controversy over whether the president or agencies have the authority to
refuse to spend appropriated moneys. Regarding presidential impoundment, see Train v. City of
New York, 420 U.S. 35, 49 (1975). See also Ralph S. Abascal & John R. Kramer, Presidential
Impoundment Part I: Historical Genesis and Constitutional Framework, 62 GEO. L.J. 1549, 1549
(1974) (describing the history of the federal budgetary system and concluding that the executive
cannot derive impoundment authority from statutes); Ralph S. Abascal & John R. Kramer,
Presidential Impoundment Part II: Judicial and Legislative Responses, 63 GEO. L.J. 149, 149
(1974) (describing the courts’ undue deference to the executive and the probable impact of the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 681–688 (2000))). Regarding the line item veto, see
Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the Line Item
Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871, 872–74 (1999) (arguing that the Act was inappropriately
analyzed by the Supreme Court, and that the Act should be constitutionally viewed as a
congressional delegation to the president of the power to withhold all spending, regardless of
the form of the spending). See also J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power of the Purse, 1989
DUKE L.J. 1162, 1162 (1989) (arguing that the president has implied powers to get money from
the treasury, even without congressional appropriation).
37. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2000).
39. There is no substantive review under NEPA.
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to politicians and lobby for reform. The welfare impact statement
would include the following information.
1. Distribution of Benefits. In 1999 Congress passed an
appropriations bill that provided relief to dairy producers who had
incurred large losses after the collapse of dairy prices. The bill
directed USDA to give money to dairy producers, but did not say (a)
which dairy producers would receive money, or (b) how much money
40
each would receive. USDA promulgated a transfer regulation that,
among other things, distributed moneys to dairy producers on the
basis of their production in 1997 and 1998. As I discuss in Part III.C,
USDA used both years in order to avoid the cost of collecting new
information from producers who had provided 1997 production
figures when enrolled in the program the year before, but as a result,
some firms, including firms that had stopped production, would
receive payments even though they did not lose money in 1998 as a
result of the market collapse.
The statement that accompanied the USDA’s transfer regulation
did not explicitly describe the distributive consequences, though they
could have been inferred from the formula in the regulation by
someone who had data about the structure of the industry. The
agency had information about the industry and could have provided
more detailed information about the distributional effects of the
regulation. It could, for example, have broken down producers by
size, and described the average level of compensation for each group
of producers—both in absolute terms and as a percentage of each
producer’s loss. The agency could also have provided correlations
between compensation level and other attributes, such as location,
number of employees, and so forth.
The reason for requiring the agency to provide this information
is that it facilitates monitoring of the agency by Congress, affected
41
parties, and the public. To the extent that agencies can provide a
concise, numerical account of the distribution of benefits, Congress,
relevant staffers, or committees can relatively easily check that the
agency is acting consistently with statutory goals. If the agency is not,

40. See infra Part III.C.
41. Regarding the effects of informational regulations, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at
191–228.
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Congress can in the future exercise greater oversight or enact more
42
precise statutes.
2. Deadweight Costs. It is possible that these distributional
effects of the dairy market regulation, though not intended by
Congress, could have been justified by a cost-effectiveness analysis,
which would show that a more accurate distribution of benefits would
have entailed excessive administrative costs. But even if this is the
case, there is the further question whether the basic statutory goal of
compensating dairy producers is desirable, given the inevitable
welfare losses that accompany any distributional scheme. One might
think that Congress took these costs into account when it enacted the
statute, or that the agency has no basis for questioning Congress’s
decision in any event. But NEPA suggests a different view: Congress
both authorizes agencies to approve projects that have harmful
environmental impacts and requires agencies to issue a report
describing these impacts. The reason is presumably to provide a
check on agencies that focus too much on their mission and discount
environmental concerns. Similarly, Congress could ask agencies both
to redistribute wealth and to report the welfare distortions caused by
redistribution.
In welfare economics, it is often said that a transfer does not
have any efficiency effects, but this statement is a simplification that
does not take account of so-called indirect costs. Every transfer
requires taxation, and all taxation causes distortions. The $200 million
appropriated for dairy producers comes from the pockets of
taxpayers, and will distort their choices between labor and leisure as
well as other activities. There are standard, albeit rough, ways to
measure this welfare loss, and the welfare loss could be reported by
43
the agency. Prescriptive regulations that redistribute wealth through
market restrictions cause even greater distortions, which can also be
calculated and reported.44 In addition, the behavior of recipients of
transfers can also be distorted as long as the transfer is not a surprise.
The dairy industry knows that it will receive transfers from Congress
when dairy prices collapse; as a result, producers do not allocate
42. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), already requires a
discussion of distribution, see id. at 51,735–36, but agencies usually respond with boilerplate.
43. See ROSEN, supra note 26, at 305–22 (describing the concept of welfare loss and
methods for measurement).
44. See GRAMLICH, supra note 31, at 123–33 (providing an analytical model for the
distorting effects of wealth redistribution programs).
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resources efficiently. Some should not be in business in the first place;
others should diversify or take other steps to protect themselves
against downturns. Every transfer reinforces the expectation that
Congress will intervene in the future, and thus results in distortions.
These distortions can be calculated and reported.
The reason for reporting this information is that Congress and
the public might not know the economic cost of the transfers that
have been authorized. The report of deadweight costs makes it
explicit that the transfer of money to dairy producers and other
interest groups has effects beyond the obvious distributional changes.
People who are willing to tolerate the distributional changes might
change their minds when they learn the accompanying deadweight
cost. In many circumstances, there will not be the political will to
repeal statutory transfers or resist enacting them in the first place, but
greater public awareness of their costs might have a desirable effect
on the margin.
3. Pareto Superior Regulations. As a supplement to the
information on deadweight costs, an agency could propose a statutory
45
scheme that is Pareto superior to the authorizing statute. Frequently,
this will be impractical or pointless, but in many cases the proposal
would make clear the problems with the statute. For example, it is
often the case that giving cash to beneficiaries is Pareto superior to
using price controls or quantity limits. Consider a statutory program
that benefits farmers by increasing prices and revenues through
restrictions on production. If, instead, the quotas were eliminated and
farmers were given cash equal to the implicit subsidy created by the
quotas, there would be money left over for taxpayers or other
beneficiaries.
One might imagine that when an agency proposes a quota
regulation pursuant to a statute that provides for quotas, it will also
report the Pareto superior statutory scheme. The report could be sent
to Congress, which might then decide to stop the regulation and

45. Cf. IVAN LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 86–88 (1950) (describing the
rise of the Pareto approach and its relevance to social welfare analysis in the first half of the
twentieth century); Stephen Coate, An Efficiency Approach to the Evaluation of Policy
Changes, 110 ECON. J. 437, 437 (2000) (proposing an approach whereby different policy changes
are compared for Pareto superiority).
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46
appropriate money for the proposed transfer. Although Congress
might often refuse to enact the Pareto superior appropriation because
of inertia, time constraints, or a desire to retain the disguise on the
transfer, in some cases it might well prefer the Pareto superior
appropriation, and act accordingly.
I have argued that regulatory oversight of transfer regulations
would be improved if agencies reported three kinds of information:
(1) the distributive effects of the regulation, (2) its welfare costs, and
(3) any Pareto superior alternatives. As Part IV discusses, Executive
Order 12,866 already authorizes the first type of reporting, and
probably the other two as well, but a statute modeled on NEPA
might also be desirable. Just as NEPA requires agencies to report the
environmental impact of regulations without directly banning
environmentally unsound regulations, the proposed statute would
require agencies to report the welfare impact of regulations without
directly banning distributively unjust regulations. The agency would,
47
in effect, route opponents of the regulation to the political process.
The benefits to the political process could be expected to be similar to
those that NEPA has produced.
There is, however, an important objection to reporting
requirements. NEPA has, in practice, imposed considerable
administrative and litigation costs on agencies. Environmentalists
have used NEPA to delay and block regulations: Agencies frequently
have decided that the administrative and litigation costs, and perhaps
the political costs as well, are so high that an otherwise legal
48
regulation is not worth defending. The NEPA experience suggests
that reporting requirements for transfer regulations might involve
high administrative costs, and be used as a weapon against transfer
regulations. Whether this is good or bad depends on how high the
costs will be, and on what kinds of regulations are likely to be
blocked. It is possible that reporting requirements can, in the

46. A legislative veto is illegal, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983), but informal
pressure on the agency might be sufficient, or else a statutory injunction against the regulation
would be necessary.
47. There are other programs designed to regulate through information disclosure; one
prominent example is the toxics release inventory. See Madhu Khanna et al., Toxics Release
Information: A Policy Tool for Environmental Protection, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 243,
243–45 (1998) (detailing the regulatory effect the disclosure of environmental information can
have on firms and how firm behavior changes after such disclosures).
48. For a discussion of the high cost and low quality of lengthy NEPA reports, see Bradley
C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s
Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 917–23 (2002).
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American legal and political system, only generate either boilerplate
(if the legal standard is low) or excessive litigation (if the legal
standard is high), in which case reporting requirements for transfer
regulations would be inadvisable. Much depends on whether there
are groups that will monitor welfare impact statements and take
agencies to court when they fail to issue adequate welfare impact
statements, as environmental groups have done for environmental
impact statements. Too much enthusiasm for litigation might lead to
interference with normal agency functions; however, too little
enthusiasm might again lead to statements containing nothing but
boilerplate.
C. Mixed Regulations and Distributional Questions
Many statutes authorize agencies to issue prescriptive regulations
that both cure market failures and effect transfers to particular
groups. A statute designed to restrict pollution might provide that
factories in one region cut emissions more than factories in another
region, or that all factories use a technology that is cheaper for some
factories than for others. If Congress could have achieved its goals
equally well or better without making these distinctions, then the
statute self-consciously redistributes wealth compared to a statute
whose distributional effects follow naturally from the primary goal of
correcting a market failure. The agency must accept statutory
constraints, and when it performs cost-benefit analysis, it must
exclude alternative regulations that have a higher benefit-cost ratio
but do not have the prescribed distributional effects.49
More interesting, when agencies have a broad mandate to solve
market failures, they will face two possible situations: (1) a single
optimal regulation that might or might not have desirable
distributional effects, and (2) multiple regulations with equal benefitcost ratios and different distributional effects.
In the first case, cost-benefit analysis supports one outcome. If
the agency promulgates a different regulation with a more attractive
distributive effect, that regulation is a mixed regulation. There is
reason to think that agencies do this. When agencies justify
regulations, they often explain how they designed the regulation so
that the burden is not concentrated on the poor, or on a particular

49. One might prefer to say that the decision procedure is cost-effectiveness analysis, but
this is just a matter of labeling.
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segment of the population, or on residents of a particular
geographical area; or they note that the regulation favors small
businesses at the expense of big businesses. For example, in 1982, the
EPA promulgated regulations governing the lead content limits for
gasoline that imposed stricter standards on larger refineries than on
50
small refineries. And agencies are directed to do this, in part by
executive orders, and perhaps also in part by a political sense of the
groups that Congress or oversight committee members care about.51
In all these cases, the agency’s decision procedure is most accurately
described not as cost-benefit analysis, but as cost-effectiveness
analysis of various routes to some distributional goal.
In the second case, cost-benefit analysis does not distinguish
among multiple regulations with different distributional effects, and
for that reasons the agency must issue a mixed regulation that reflects
an implicit or explicit decision about distribution. In the absence of
legislative guidance, the agency might rely on any of the factors
described in the previous paragraph, or on its own beliefs about
distributional equities. In this case, the agency’s decision procedure is
cost-benefit analysis, but supplemented with (not constrained by) a
distributive judgment.
A related question—but one that can only be mentioned and not
answered here—is why there is no distributional analogy to Executive
Order 12,866’s mandate to use cost-benefit analysis. In theory, an
executive order could require agencies that are given vague statutory
direction to promulgate prescriptive or transfer regulations that meet
certain distributional criteria. Indeed, it appears that agencies already
52
do this, albeit in an ad hoc way. The question is why OMB does not
demand more consistent and specific distributional results—for
example, regulations that improve the Gini coefficient, or some other
measure of equality.53 No doubt the answer has to do with the
difficulty of specifying distributional criteria that are as clear as the
50. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 40 C.F.R. pt. 80 (1982) (amended 1996).
51. See Draft 2003 OMB Report, supra note 1, at 5,514 (general requirements); Exec.
Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999) (federalism); Exec. Order No.
12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629, 7,629–30 (Feb. 11, 1994) (environmental justice); Exec. Order No.
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,736 (Oct. 4, 1993) (distributive impact).
52. See the farm relief regulation discussed infra in Part III.A; the agency imposed a cap on
the size of the transfer without any statutory authority, thus favoring smaller producers relative
to larger producers (though not necessarily wealthier producers relative to poorer producers).
53. For a discussion of the Gini coefficient, the Poverty Index, and other measures of
distributional inequality, see JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 230–35
(1986).
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cost-benefit standard, but this difficulty itself is something of
54
a mystery.
D. The Opportunities and Limits of OMB Review
The OMB has been the chief force behind the spread of costbenefit principles among agencies, and it could serve a similar role for
cost-effectiveness analysis. How cost-effectiveness analysis of transfer
regulations might improve the political process depends on the goals
and incentives of the relevant political actors. One can distinguish two
broad possibilities—both are caricatures intended only to make clear
the forces at work.
1. Congress Is Honest but Agencies Are Not. Suppose that
Congress honestly legislates in the public interest, but that agencies
have specific goals or missions that deviate from congressional goals.
Congress has diverse methods for disciplining agencies, but with
agenda setting power and superior information about their regulatory
domain, agencies can issue regulations that differ from Congress’s
ideal. However, if agencies were required to perform costeffectiveness analyses on transfer regulations, and faced sanctions if
they did not, they would be forced to divulge some of their private
information, which would facilitate monitoring by Congress or the
relevant committees. Here, cost-effectiveness analysis, like costbenefit analysis of prescriptive market-correcting regulations, is a
55
device for solving a principal-agent problem.
2. Congress Is Dishonest but the President Is Not. Suppose that
Congress seeks to pay off interest groups, while the president, with
his broad national mandate, prefers to regulate in the public interest.
Transfer statutes, then, do not distribute wealth to deserving
beneficiaries, but to interest groups. However, because Congress
enacts vague statutes that delegate a great deal of discretion to
agencies, the president can use his authority over the agencies to
counter Congress’s efforts. Consider a tax credit law that has the
overt aim of creating jobs but is in fact intended to, or partly intended
to, benefit firms that fill out the forms for companies that claim the
54. See LARRY TEMKIN, INEQUALITY 91, 118 (1996) (discussing various possibilities for
the correct criteria of equality).
55. Cf. Posner, supra note 7, at 1140 (discussing “cost-benefit analysis as a method by
which the President, Congress, or the judiciary controls agency behavior”).

POSNER.DOC

1092

07/07/04 1:39 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:1067

56
tax credit. If the statute is vague enough, and does not explicitly
require contracting with members of the interest group, then a
regulation that does involve that group is likely to fail a costeffectiveness analysis. Thus, the president, through OMB, can use the
cost-effectiveness obligation to resist congressional efforts to disguise
transfers, forcing Congress either to make the transfers explicit—
which entails political costs—or to abandon them.

E. Judicial Review
Judicial deference to agency action is justified by division of
labor: agencies are specialists, judges are generalists. The problem
with judicial deference is that agencies can use their discretion in
ways that are inconsistent with social welfare and congressional
policy, as the case may be. Agencies might transfer resources to
politically powerful interest groups or indulge ideological passions not
shared by the public. The virtue of cost-benefit analysis (as a statutory
mandate) is that it harnesses the power of quantification, permitting
courts to scrutinize an agency’s decision without reproducing it. When
monetization of costs and benefits does not otherwise distort the
agency’s mission too much, judicial enforcement of cost-benefit
analysis will produce better regulations, regulations that do not reflect
the internal biases of the agency or its chief.57
As has been seen, cost-benefit analysis is not suitable for
evaluating transfer regulations. If judges enforced cost-benefit
analysis, all transfer regulations would be struck down. However, with
legislative authorization—or through aggressive interpretation of the
58
arbitrary and capricious standard —courts could use costeffectiveness analysis to review transfer regulations. This review
could take many forms. At the lowest level, courts would remand
regulations when the accompanying statement in the Federal Register
does not include cost-effectiveness ratios for the regulation itself and

56. Compare to the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 51 (2000) (now the Work
Opportunity Tax Credit), discussed in Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of
Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 521–22 (1998)
(arguing that “the most vociferous supporters of the targeted jobs tax credit were not the
disadvantaged groups covered by the provision nor the businesses that claimed the credit,” but
rather the “firms that helped employers determine which employees qualified for the tax credit
and complete the necessary tax forms”).
57. This is Sunstein’s view, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 191–228, although he thinks
judges should be highly deferential because of their lack of expertise, id. at 225.
58. See the discussion infra in Part III.C.
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for a range of plausible alternative regulations. In addition, a transfer
regulation that is less cost-effective than an alternative within the
agency’s authority would be vacated on judicial review, and on
remand the agency would be required to issue the cost-effective
transfer regulation. There would still be a place for judicial deference,
as in the case for cost-benefit analysis; determining the distributional
goals of a statute would need to be discretionary within a broad
range. But this would not mean that the agency is unconstrained. At a
minimum, agencies would be required to act consistently across
regulations. In a similar way, if agencies have some discretion to
choose discount factors and valuations of life for cost-benefit analysis,
a consistency requirement across regulations and agencies would
constrain their behavior in useful ways.59
My suggestion is not radical. Courts already review agencies’
cost-effectiveness analyses when transfer regulations are the subject
60
of litigation. Part III discusses some examples. But, as will be seen,
the judicial efforts are dispiriting. Although courts focus on the right
issues—whether inaccurate distributions should be tolerated in order
to reduce administrative costs—courts rarely demand that agencies
provide data that support their cost-effectiveness analyses, so it is
always hard to see why courts approve some transfer regulations
while rejecting others. One senses that courts rely on a rough sense of
the ideal distributional outcome intended by the statute and are
impatient with arguments that administrative cost savings justify
reliance on crude proxies or bright-line rules that result in
distributions that deviate from the ideal. If courts think it proper to
defer to agency judgments, then they should not reject these
arguments; if they think it proper to scrutinize the agency’s claims,
they should demand data and base their own judgment on an
assessment of the facts. Currently, they do neither.

59. See Posner, supra note 7, at 1191–92 (arguing that agencies, when performing costbenefit analyses, should be forced to be consistent with all kinds of valuations, including
valuations of life and discount factors).
60. Here are two others: McDaniels v. United States, 300 F.3d 407, 411 (4th Cir. 2002),
where the court defended the agency’s decision to use gross revenues as a proxy for net income
on grounds of administrative cost, and Michigan Head Start Directors Ass’n v. Butz, 397 F. Supp.
1124, 1140 (W.D. Mich. 1975), where the court rejected a similar proxy on the ground that the
administrative cost savings (nowhere specified) were insufficient.
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III. SOME EXAMPLES
According to OMB reports to Congress, agencies have
promulgated several hundred transfer regulations, counting only
those regulations that have had an impact of at least $100 million or
are otherwise considered “major” under OMB’s conventions. Each
one of these regulations was published in the Federal Register along
with a statement that the regulation complied with Executive Order
12,866. Many of the statements contain boilerplate, but a significant
number contain a cost-effectiveness analysis, or at least a gesture in
that direction.
No scholar has tried to determine whether these regulations are,
as a group, cost-effective. At first sight, this gap in the literature
seems odd, for there is a large literature on the related question of
whether prescriptive regulations issued under market-correcting
61
statutes are cost-justified. But the reason for the different levels of
attention devoted to these questions is probably that agencies’ costbenefit analyses supply much more data than agencies’ costeffectiveness analyses, making scholarly review of the cost-benefit
analyses easier.
In the absence of agency supplied data about cost-effectiveness,
the best way to determine whether agencies issue cost-effective
transfer regulations would be through an empirical study that
collected all the regulations and determined whether their costeffectiveness ratios were superior to plausible alternatives. Such a
study, however, would be nearly impossible. One cannot know
whether a regulation that provides school lunches at $5 per lunch is
cost-effective unless one knows what alternatives are available, and if
the agency does not provide a thorough and credible discussion of the
alternatives (and they never do, as far as I have found), one could not
know what these alternatives would be without becoming an expert in
62
every field of regulation. As a result, one cannot evaluate transfer

61.

See, e.g.
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regulations on the basis of their cost-effectiveness in the same
systematic way that John Morrall evaluated health and safety
63
regulations on the basis of their implicit valuations of life.
For these reasons, I will take the less ambitious route and
evaluate the quality of the cost-effectiveness analysis in a small
sample of regulations. The point here is not to defend or criticize the
regulations themselves, but to evaluate the reasoning of the agency.
A. Farm Relief
After the collapse of farm prices in 1998, Congress appropriated
$3 billion for farm relief, of which $200 million was directed to dairy
64
producers “in a manner determined by the Secretary” of USDA.
The Secretary thus had to develop a formula for distributing the $200
million among the many dairy producers who lost money. This is not
as easy as it sounds: the problem is determining how much a
particular producer lost as a result of the price decline. One idea
would be to look at how much milk the producer manufactured in the
year prior to the market collapse, and give the producer an amount of
money equal to the industry-wide average level of profits per unit of
milk that the affected producer manufactured in the prior year. This
formula, however, would overcompensate unprofitable producers: if
these producers would have made no profits in 1998 even if prices had
not declined, any payment would overcompensate them. On the other
hand, it would have been very difficult to determine the lost income
of each producer on the basis of a projection to 1998. Apparently for
this reason, the Secretary chose a bright-line rule that awarded a fixed
amount per unit of milk produced in the earlier year. She also capped
compensation at 2.6 million pounds of milk.65 This cap favored smaller
producers.
In 2000, Congress appropriated another $325 million for dairy
producers (and livestock producers as well), directing the Secretary to
use the money “to compensate producers for economic losses

David M. Cutler, Health Care and the Public Sector, in 4 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
2145 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002).
63. Morrall, supra note 61, at 29–34.
64. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, sec. 101(a), tit. XI, § 1111(d), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681−744 (1998).
65. 7 C.F.R. §§ 1430.502–.506 (2003).
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66
incurred during 1999.” The Secretary maintained the cap issued
under the prior regulation, and also provided that producers signed
up in the first year of the program would be automatically enrolled in
the second year of the program. Payments would be based on
production in 1997 and 1998.67 As a result, producers who had gone
out of business in 1999, or even 1998, would nonetheless obtain
compensation as though they had been in business but had lost
money. Milk Train, a consortium of large milk producers, brought
suit against the Secretary, arguing that the cap and the automatic
enrollment provisions favored smaller dairy producers.68 The cap
clearly prevented larger producers from obtaining compensation for
their losses beyond the cap, and the automatic enrollment provisions
extended this preferential treatment to producers (presumably,
smaller producers) who were no longer in the dairy business.
The Secretary argued that the rule complied with Executive
Order 12,866 (the most recent cost-benefit executive order) and
69
passed a cost-benefit test, a claim that was apparently accepted by
the D.C. Circuit Court.70 Although the agency’s description of the
cost-benefit analysis is hard to follow, the Secretary seemed to believe
that a payment of $173 million to dairy producers could create
benefits of $400 to $600 million. “The differences between outlays,
which are virtually all direct transfers to program participants, and
income, are made up of increased dairy prices . . . .”71 This explanation
is incoherent. Cash transfers to dairy producers would not normally
increase dairy prices, but even if they did, the loss to consumers—not
mentioned anywhere—would offset the gain in income.
The Crop and Market Loss Assistance rule fails a cost-benefit
analysis, as indeed does any rule that determines how money
appropriated by Congress would be distributed to beneficiaries. But it
does not follow that any rule that the Secretary might promulgate

66. Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-78, §§ 805, 822, 825, 113 Stat. 1135, 1179,
1186–87 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
67. 7 C.F.R. §§ 1430.502.–.506.
68. Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
69. 1999 Crop and Market Loss Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg. 7,942, 7,948 (Feb. 16, 2000).
70. See Milk Train, 310 F.3d at 754, 756 (relying on the existence of the cost-benefit
analysis in holding that the cap and automatic enrollment provisions were proper). Executive
Order 12,866 cannot be enforced by a court; the argument probably was made because a costjustified regulation would not seem arbitrary and capricious under the APA.
71. 1999 Crop and Market Loss Assistance, 65 Fed. Reg. at 7,948.
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would be equally bad or good. The Milk Train case centered on just
this question. Milk Train complained that the rule violated the statute
by favoring smaller producers, and the Secretary argued that
deviations from the statutory goal were justified by administrative
cost savings.
It is possible that the automatic enrollment portion of the rule
was more cost-effective than an alternative procedure, such as a
requirement that dairy producers fill out new applications and
provide supporting evidence. The automatic enrollment provision was
intended to avoid the cost of applying for compensation and the cost
of processing applications, the first borne by the producers and the
second borne by USDA. The provision, however, would also result in
the transfer of moneys to producers who had gone out of business,
leaving less in the treasury for the intended beneficiaries of the
statute. The question, then, is whether the administrative cost savings
justified these error costs. Answering this question requires some
numbers. USDA could have estimated the application and processing
costs by extrapolating from its past experiences with administering
transfer programs, and USDA could have estimated the error costs
from industry data on liquidations of producers. It seems likely that
these estimates would have been relatively easy to make and would
not involve vast administrative expenses. But because USDA did not
make these estimates, and provide the relevant data, it is impossible
to know whether the automatic enrollment provision was costeffective.
72
It is less likely that the cap was cost-effective. It is hard to see
how it could have saved administrative costs, while it clearly deprived
large producers of their entitlements under the statute.
B. School Breakfasts and Lunches
The School Breakfast Program, National School Lunch Act, and
Child Nutrition Act established the School Breakfast Program, which
provided funds for eligible schools that offer free breakfasts to their
73
students. School districts and state educational agencies apply for
funds from the USDA, which issues regulations describing the criteria
for eligibility. The statute provides that one goal of the program,
72. The court held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Secretary’s
decision to impose the cap, which, in the court’s view, was discretionary under 5 U.S.C. §
701(a)(2) (2000) of the APA. Milk Train, 310 F.3d at 751–52.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1773 (2000) (school breakfast program authorization).
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although not the only goal, is to ensure that funds for breakfasts “to
74
the maximum extent practicable . . . reach needy children.” The
plaintiffs, a class of needy children, argued that USDA violated the
statute by failing to demand from school districts enough information
to determine that needy children were being helped, and for refusing
to withhold funds from schools in districts that failed to provide such
information.75
The challenged regulations required that applicants provide
information about how they planned to distribute funds and how
many schools with needy students would not be served, but the
76
requirements were minimal. The states themselves defined “needy”
in an inconsistent way, and many states did not reveal how they
defined need, so that a school with a fair number of needy students
might be defined as a non-needy school. Further, USDA did not have
in place any process for verifying that the states provided accurate
information; did not try to encourage states to bring more needy
children within the program; and did not encourage compliance by
threatening uncooperative school districts with sanctions at its
disposal, such as a cutoff of federal aid.77 The court did not quarrel
with all of these practices, but it ordered USDA to issue regulations
that required schools to provide more information about the effect of
their plans on needy children.78
The case reflects the tradeoff between decision and error costs.
USDA emphasized decision costs. It did not demand much
information from states and did not verify that information, because
doing so would have been too costly—both for the schools and for
USDA. As a result, many schools would obtain funds even though
they did not serve needy children, and many schools that served
needy children would not obtain funds. The court’s holding implicitly
assumed that more stringent information requirements would not
burden the schools or USDA too much, but rather would reduce the
amount of error. But the court was not willing to demand a great deal
of extra work from USDA, presumably because it thought that that
excessive decision costs would interfere with the operation of the

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

42 U.S.C. § 1759a(e)(1)(C) (2000).
Charette v. Bergland, 457 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (D.R.I. 1978).
7 C.F.R. § 220.7 (2003).
Charette, 457 F. Supp. at 1205–06.
Id. at 1207.
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program, burden schools, or have a similar perverse effect on the
distribution of funds.
The court, however, did not explain why it thought that
demanding more information from states was cost-justified but that
verifying the accuracy of this information was not necessarily costjustified (an issue left for remand). These claims are susceptible to
empirical analysis. For the states, determining the numbers and
locations of needy students in the school system is expensive: surveys
must be conducted, answers must be verified, and data must be
compiled. For USDA, verifying the information provided by the
states may or may not be costly: spot checks along with the threat of
funds cutoff might be sufficient to ensure the states’ honesty. USDA
should have estimated and reported the administrative costs of both
the regulation in question and the alternative regulations that
imposed more rigorous and less rigorous application and verification
procedures.
On the error cost side, the statutory language indicates that
Congress wanted to ensure that needy children received lunches, but
also did not mind if non-needy children received lunches. At a
minimum, USDA should have discussed alternative regulations, and
in particular reported how many needy children each regulation
would have likely helped. The estimates of the number of children
who would be helped by the regulation could have been based on
widely available demographic information concerning the distribution
of needy and non-needy children in school districts. If USDA was
charged with exhausting an appropriation, then the cost-effective
regulation would most likely have been that regulation that provided
lunches to the most needy children. If the appropriation was not
determined or budgeted in advance, then the cost-effective regulation
would be the one that provided lunches to needy children at the least
79
cost per lunch. The one complication is Congress’s apparent
ambivalence about funding lunches for non-needy children. A
regulation that saved on administrative costs but resulted in the
funding of lunches for a number of non-needy children, as well as
needy children, would arguably be more cost-effective than a
regulation that resulted in substantial administrative costs but aided
only needy children. Here, USDA would seem to be given discretion,
but it should have reported how it used its discretion by revealing the
implicit or explicit weight that it put on receipt of a lunch by a non79.

See supra Part II.A.
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needy child. Because USDA failed to provide the necessary
information, it is impossible to evaluate USDA’s actual regulation on
cost-effectiveness grounds.
C. Food Stamps
The Food Stamp Program, like the School Breakfast Program,
gives the Secretary of USDA a great deal of discretion to issue
regulations, in this case as he “deems necessary or appropriate for the
80
effective and efficient administration” of the program. Under the
program, USDA issued regulations providing that, among other
things, food stamps would be sent by mail and the federal government
would replace food stamps that were lost in the mail. Subsequently,
Congress enacted a statute that authorized USDA to share the costs
with the states, and USDA issued a new regulation that required
states to pay for lost food stamps above a threshold—0.5 percent of
the value of the coupons sent through the mail.81 The purpose of the
regulation was to give states the “incentive to reduce [mail]
82
losses” —presumably by cracking down on food stamp thieves. The
state of New Mexico brought suit challenging the cost-sharing
83
regulation.
New Mexico argued that the regulation assumed that lost
coupons were inevitably redeemed—that is, they were not really lost
but stolen and used by the thieves or customers of the thieves—when
84
many coupons really were just lost. If the coupons were really lost,
then USDA did not lose any money, aside from the trivial printing
costs when it replaced the coupons, and thus should not have been
entitled to reimbursement from the state. USDA argued, and the
court agreed, that
it would have been irrational for the Department of Agriculture to
adopt a tracking system for food stamp issuances and redemptions
as the State of New Mexico suggests. Such a system likely would cost
more than the savings expected from the mail loss reduction

80. 7 U.S.C. § 2013(c) (2000).
81. 7 C.F.R. § 276.2 (2002).
82. Food Stamp Program; Mail Issuance Loss Tolerance Levels, 47 Fed. Reg. 50,681, 50,682
(Nov. 9, 1982).
83. Gallegos v. Lyng, 891 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1989).
84. Id. at 791–93.
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program; thus it was not arbitrary or capricious for FNS to reject
85
this proposal.

The court agreed that decision costs associated with the tracking
regulation would have outweighed the error costs, and therefore held
86
that the agency’s decision was not illegal.
As far as the opinion indicates, the court took the agency’s word
that the tracking system would have cost more than it saved. But this
claim was an empirical claim, susceptible to cost-effectiveness
analysis. The cost of a tracking system included staff time and other
expenses; the benefit of a tracking system was, in this case, the cost
savings for the state, but, more broadly, the reduction of resources
that would go to criminals rather than to the intended beneficiaries of
the food stamp program. The cost-effectiveness inquiry is whether the
tracking system would cost less in dollar terms than the extra
appropriations needed to replace coupons that would not have been
lost if a tracking system had been in effect. An adequate costeffectiveness analysis would contain estimates of these costs. It would
also have considered alternative regulations.
There is a further interesting federalism dimension to the
regulation. The question was not whether USDA would have saved
Congress money by using the tracking system; the question rather was
whether USDA would have saved states and Congress money by
using the tracking system. Recall that the idea of loss sharing was to
give states an incentive to crack down on food stamp thieves and save
Congress money. Even if the tracking system would not have been
cost-effective, there was a separate question whether the 0.5 percent
threshold gave states the optimal incentive to invest in greater
policing. A low threshold would cause states to externalize the costs
on the federal government; but a high threshold would cause states to
overinvest (and redundantly invest) in food stamp policing when it
would be better for the federal government to use a centralized
monitoring system. Indeed, this was New Mexico’s claim. USDA
should have estimated the effects of different thresholds on the
incentives of states to invest in policing.
Thus an adequate cost-effectiveness analysis would determine
(1) how much different investments in policing would reduce mail
thefts of food stamps, and (2) how sensitive states are to different

85.
86.

Id. at 792.
Id. at 795.
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cost-sharing rules. An empirical study could determine (roughly) the
level of police investment where the marginal cost of the investment
equals the marginal benefit in food stamp savings; and then a separate
study could determine the cost-sharing arrangement that would cause
states to engage in the optimal level of investment. Although USDA
understood this basic logic, it did not provide the relevant
information for determining whether it performed a valid costeffectiveness analysis.
D. Medicare: Outpatient Diabetes Self-Management Training
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 expanded Medicare coverage
87
of self-management training programs for diabetics. In 2000, the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published a final
rule that, among other things, limited coverage to training ordered by
a physician or other qualified practitioner, required that the physician
provide a plan of care, described the elements of a valid training
program, and identified the medical conditions that would qualify for
the coverage.88 The statute provided for the transfer of resources to
beneficiaries; therefore, the regulation that implemented the statute
was a transfer regulation.
Of special interest is HHS’s discussion of Executive Order
12,866, which it said applied to the regulation because the regulation
would have an impact of greater than $100 million per year. HHS
then proceeded to discuss the costs and benefits of the regulation. On
the cost side, HHS started out promisingly. There were 4.5 million
Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes, but because many of them
already had training or would not qualify for it under the proposed
regulation, about 2.25 million would receive benefits under the
regulation. Each of these individuals would receive ten to twelve
hours of training. Multiplying the number of beneficiaries by the
number of hours and by a training cost (not specified), and taking
account of the capacity of accredited programs and the time lag
before a sufficient number would be in operation, HHS estimated
budgetary costs of $150 million in fiscal year 2001, increasing to $280
89
million in fiscal year 2005. But then HHS faltered. It mentioned that

87. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21 (2000).
88. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Care Financing Administration,
Medicare Program; Expanded Coverage for Outpatient Diabetes Self-Management Training
and Diabetes Outcome Measurements, Part II, 65 Fed. Reg. 83,130 (Dec. 29, 2000).
89. Id. at 83,146–47.
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diabetes can cause death, heart disease, blindness, and many other
medical problems, and that self-management can reduce these
90
problems, but it did not monetize these factors. It should have
calculated the net cost of the program by subtracting the medical
costs averted from the cost of self-management training. Having done
that, HHS should next have calculated the cost-effectiveness ratio by
dividing the next cost of the program by the stipulated benefit, such
as QALYs gained.
One cannot know whether the regulation is cost-effective
without knowing the effectiveness of the training program. If the
effectiveness is high enough, and the benefits are high enough, then
the regulation would be cost-effective; otherwise, it would not be. If it
is cost-effective, what this means is that given the goal of providing
aid to a class of people who have illnesses, it is cheaper for the
government to achieve this goal by paying for self-management
training than by paying for medical care for symptoms that could
have been avoided through self-management. (Alternatively, costeffectiveness analysis might have revealed that giving more intensive
training to fewer people, or less intensive training to more people,
would have produced a greater ratio of benefits to costs.) As is always
the case, the cost-effectiveness analysis would not show that Medicare
coverage is welfare maximizing; it shows that given the goals of
Medicare coverage, one kind of transfer is superior to another.
To sum up, HHS recognized that Executive Order 12,866 applied
to the diabetes self-management regulation, and it performed a
regulatory impact analysis. But its regulatory impact analysis was
inadequate. It identified the budgetary costs of the regulation, but did
not reduce them to a present value. More important, it failed to
provide an estimate of the probability that self-management would
result in cost savings and QALY gains; it failed to monetize the cost
savings and subtract them from the cost of the program; and it failed
to compare the cost-benefit ratio of the regulation in question with
the cost-benefit ratios of alternative regulations. As a result, one
cannot determine from the regulatory impact analysis whether the
regulation is cost-effective.

90.

Id.
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IV. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF TRANSFER REGULATIONS
Executive Order 12,866 requires agencies to perform costeffectiveness analysis on transfer regulations. Several clauses of this
order are pertinent:
When an agency determines that a regulation is the best available
method of achieving the regulatory objective, it shall design its
regulations in the most cost-effective manner to achieve the
regulatory objective. In doing so, each agency shall consider
incentives for innovation, consistency, predictability, the costs of
enforcement and compliance (to the government, regulated entities,
91
and the public), flexibility, distributive impacts, and equity.

This provision appears to apply to transfer regulations. Other
provisions of the executive order direct agencies to conduct costbenefit analysis; this provision seems to acknowledge that a costbenefit analysis might not be consistent with the “regulatory
objective.” If the regulatory objective is not efficiency, it must be
redistribution.92 Because the regulatory objective is set by statute, the
president cannot override it through an executive order. But the
president can, given standard views of presidential power, guide the
means that agencies use to obtain the objective, and this surely
includes requiring agencies to use less expensive rather than more
expensive methods for achieving the objective. The agency must
choose the most “cost-effective manner” for achieving this
distribution, one that accounts for “the costs of enforcement and
compliance”—what I call decisions costs—and distributive impacts—
what I call error costs.
An additional provision requires agencies to provide information
about these costs and benefits. The provision says that the agency
should provide
an assessment, including the underlying analysis, of costs and
benefits of potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives
to the planned regulation, identified by the agencies or the public
(including improving the current regulation and reasonably viable

91. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,736 (Oct. 4, 1993).
92. Or some other nonefficiency moral goal such as changing preferences, but this is not
the case in the transfer regulations that I have examined.
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nonregulatory actions), and an explanation why the planned
regulatory action is preferable to the identified potential
93
alternatives.

This is a reporting requirement, and it could be used to force agencies
to reveal the results of a cost-effectiveness analysis.
Agencies have not (with a few exceptions) accepted these
invitations to perform cost-effectiveness analysis on transfer
regulations, but OMB could prod them to do so, as OMB has
prodded agencies to perform cost-benefit analysis on regulations
designed to solve market failures. Following the cost-benefit model,
OMB could announce that agencies should conduct cost-effectiveness
analysis of transfer regulations and that OMB will send back to
agencies any transfer regulations that are not accompanied by a
satisfactory assessment of their cost-effectiveness.
Executive Order 12,866 does not direct agencies to report the
economic distortions caused by the transfer statute, as implemented
in regulations, or to report Pareto superior distributions that are
94
outside the authority of the agency. To achieve this end, either the
president would need to amend the executive order, OMB would
need to issue new guidelines, or Congress would need to enact a
statute modeled on NEPA. The new language might say:
All major transfer regulations must be accompanied by a report of
(1) alternative rules or transfers of money, if any, that would obtain
the same distributive goals at a lower cost; and (2) a calculation of
the economic distortions caused by the transfer regulations.

For example, a major regulation that implements price supports
would identify potential tax-and-transfer regimes for obtaining the
same distributional goals at lower cost, and would calculate the
economic cost of the price supports.
CONCLUSION
Executive Order 12,866 already requires regulatory agencies to
perform cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis for major
regulations, and agencies have correctly concluded that transfer
regulations are not exempt. But they have rarely performed cost-

93.
94.

Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,741.
One could possibly find some authority in the executive order itself. Id. at 51,735–36.
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effectiveness analysis, and their occasional efforts have
been inadequate.
Given the current low level of activity, agencies could improve
regulatory performance dramatically by following some simple
precepts. Agencies should always report several alternative
regulations, not just the regulation that they propose. These
alternatives could be generated by staff or by outsiders, including
regulated entities. Agencies should describe the distributional effects
and administrative costs of each regulation and provide costeffectiveness ratios under alternative assumptions. Agencies should
discount costs and benefits as they do when performing cost-benefit
analysis. And agencies should calculate and report the welfare costs
of their regulations.
Courts frequently review cost-effectiveness analyses performed
by agencies when litigants challenge transfer regulations under the
Administrative Procedure Act, but their judgments do not inspire
confidence. Judicial review would be more valuable if courts
demanded that agencies supply the data used in the cost-effectiveness
analyses, and courts had a more adequate understanding of costeffectiveness principles. Although many courts understand that
administrative cost savings justify reliance on transfer regulations that
are rough rather than specific, they also need to understand that one
cannot evaluate transfer regulations properly without information
about the cost savings and the expected distribution of benefits.
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APPENDIX
Transfer Regulations Reviewed by OMB Between April 1, 2000 and
95
September 30, 2001
Department of Agriculture
Agricultural Disaster and Market Assistance
2000 Crop Agricultural Disaster and Market Assistance
Market Assistance for Cottonseed, Tobacco, and Wool and Mohair
Bioenergy Program
Farm Storage Facility Loan Program
Wool, Mohair, and Apple Market Loss Assistance Programs
Dairy, Honey, and Cranberry Market Loss Assistance and Sugar
Programs
Livestock Assistance, American Indian Livestock Feed, Pasture
Recovery, and Dairy Price Support Programs
2000 Crop Disaster Program
Catastrophic Risk Protection Endorsement
Food Stamp Program: Recipient Claim Establishment and
Collection Standards
National School Lunch and School Breakfast Program: Additional
Menu Planning Approaches
Requirements for and Evaluation of WIC Program Bid Solicitations
for Infant Formula Rebate Contracts
Non-Discretionary Provisions of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
Non-Citizen Eligibility and Certification Provisions of Public Law
104-193
Food Stamp Program: Personal Responsibility Provisions of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996
Department of Defense
Tricare: Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed
Services (CHAMPUS), NDAA for Fiscal Year 2001 and
Pharmacy Benefits Program
Department of Health and Human Services
Medicare Program: Medicare + Choice
Prospective Payment System for Home Health Agencies
Prospective Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled
Nursing Facilities
95.

These regulations are drawn from 2002 OMB REPORT, supra note 2, at 58–61.
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Medicare Program: Hospital Inpatient Payments and Rates and
Costs for Graduate Medical Education (1999)
Medicare Program: Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective
Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 2001 Rates
Medicare Program: Revisions to Payment Policies Under the
Physician Fee Schedule for Calendar Year 2001
Medicare Program: Expanded Coverage for Outpatient Diabetes
Prospective Payment System for Hospital Outpatient Services
Revision to Medicaid Upper Payment Limit Requirements for
Inpatient Hospital Services
Medicaid Program: Medicaid Managed Care
Medicaid Program: Change in Application of Federal Financial
Participation Limits
Medicare Program: Inpatient Payments and Rates and Costs for
Graduate Medical Education (2000)
Medicare Program: Prospective Payment System and Consolidated
Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities—Update
Medicare Program: Prospective Payment System for Inpatient
Rehabilitation Hospital Services
Medicare Program: Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective
Payment Systems and Rates and Costs of Graduate Medical
Education for Fiscal Year 2002
Modification of the Medicaid Upper Payment Limit Transition
Period for Hospitals, Nursing Facilities, and Clinic Services
State Child Health; Implementing Regulations for the State
Children’s Health Insurance Programs
Social Security Administration
Supplemental Security Income: Determining Disability for a Child
Under Age 18
Revised Medical Criteria for Determination of Disability,
Musculoskeletal System and Related Criteria
Collection of the Title XVI Cross-Program Recovery
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
Risk-based Capital
Department of Labor
Government Contractors, Affirmative Action Requirements
Claims for Compensation Under the Energy Employees
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act
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Procedures for Predetermination of Wage Rates; Labor Standards
Provisions Applicable to Contracts Covering Federally Financed
and Assisted Construction and to Certain Nonconstruction
Contracts (“Helpers”)
Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation
Department of Transportation
Safety Incentive Grants for the Use of Seatbelts
Amendment of Regulations Governing Railroad Rehabilitation and
Improvement Financing Program
Veterans Administration
Disease Associated with Exposure to Certain Herbicide Agents:
Type 2 Diabetes
Federal Emergency Management Administration
Supplemental Property Acquisition and Elevation Assistance
Disaster Assistance: Cerro Grande Fire Assistance
Supplemental Property Acquisition and Elevation Assistance
Small Business Administration
Small Business Size Standards: General Building Contractors, etc.
New Market Venture Capital Program
Office of Personnel Management
Health Insurance Premium Conversion
Federal Acquisition Regulation
Electronic Commerce in Federal Procurement: FAR Case 1997-304
Electronic Commerce and Information Technology Accessibility:
FAR Case 1999-607
Securities and Exchange Commission
Disclosure of Mutual Fund After-Tax Returns
Privacy of Consumer Financial Information
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading
Unlisted Trading Privileges
Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Practices
Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements
Federal Trade Commission
Privacy of Consumer Financial Information
Federal Communications Commission
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Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local Telecommunications
Markets
Competitive Bidding Procedures
Installment Payment Financing for Personal Communications
Services Licensees
Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 2000
Narrowband Personal Communications Services; Competitive
Bidding
24 GHz. Service; Licensing and Operation
Extending Wireless Telecommunications Services to Tribal Lands
Assessment and Collection of Regulatory Fees for Fiscal Year 2001
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Revision of Fee Schedules; 100% Fee Recovery
Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models
Revision of Fee Schedules; Fee Recovery for fiscal year 2001
Federal Reserve System
Privacy of Consumer Financial Information

